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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Washington 25, D.C.

G2-CDPL

27 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James G. Reber
Intelligence Survey Team
Office of Intelligence Coordination, CIA

SUBJECT: USIA Survey

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 24 May 1954 requesting information on the relation between the intelligence requirements of USIA and those of G2.

2. In regard to your question (1), review of the types of information required by USIA indicates that intelligence on all the items listed is also required for military psychological warfare planning, operations and training. Such intelligence is needed in detail and volume by the Office, Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of Army. OC/PsyWar's requirements are based on the responsibility of the Armed Forces for planning and execution of United States psychological operations in military theaters of operations. Thus, while USIA needs this intelligence for immediate day-to-day activities, OC/PsyWar must prepare "country plans" and plan operations in all potential theaters of war. The same categories of intelligence, in varying degrees, are needed by OC/PsyWar to discharge its responsibilities in Department of Defense participation in current peacetime national psychological warfare projects. Consequently, the Army is an important customer in the same fields of intelligence in which USIA has essential requirements.

3. In regard to your question (2), it is probable that no user of intelligence, particularly on the Soviet Bloc, feels that his needs are being satisfactorily met. OC/PsyWar has consistently indicated that it considers available intelligence on the items listed to be inadequate for its purposes. OC/PsyWar's dissatisfaction has been a particular problem to G2 since its needs are heavily concentrated in political, sociological, and related fields. G2, of course, is

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charged primarily with collection and production of orthodox military intelligence on foreign ground forces (basic, staff and current) and does not have the resources to undertake a large-scale effort in other fields.

4. Consequently, G2 and OC/PsyWar have relied heavily on other facilities, outside G2, to provide the information and intelligence required. For example, G2 recently requested CIA to authorize direct, informal contact between OC/PsyWar and FBIID for the purpose of providing user guidance to FBIID in media and propaganda analysis.

5. Another major effort to obtain pertinent intelligence has been in the area of external research. Through this means, OC/PsyWar is receiving detailed studies covering certain aspects of the items in your memorandum from the Operations Research Office (ORO), through Project POWOW, and from the Human Resources Research Office (HUMERO) on various sociological and intelligence problems. Other external research projects are being contemplated by OC/PsyWar to provide more-or-less encyclopedic sociological information on Soviet Bloc countries. This research has provided a necessary supplement to G2's very limited capability for detailed research on broad areas on subjects which are basically non-military.

6. In response to your question (3), G2 has some collection capability in each of the items listed, but G2's mission and resources do not permit a major effort in this field. Much useful information is acquired by overseas commands through interrogation of escapees and defectors and by attaches through observation, but this type of collection obviously cannot provide the detail and collateral information required to give an adequate picture of any items in your list. G2 field agencies are constantly making available to USIA field outlets such information and knowledgeable individuals as come into the Army's hands. The current arrangement for USIA exploitation of individuals under the Army's control in Europe is a case in point and is working very satisfactorily according to a current report from a representative of USIA through G2, USAREUR.

7. In addition to the foregoing, Army collectors have been made aware of G2's needs for information in certain fields and statements of these needs are utilized in interrogations, on field trips, etc. These requirements are set down in such statements as Intelligence Collection

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Memorandum No. 40 on "Department of the Army Propaganda Requirements" and No. 45 on "Anti-Regime Activities, Organization, and Trends in Soviet Bloc Countries." These statements were addressed to all Army field commands and attaches concerned for action, and to other IAC agencies for information. Another means for levying requirements has been the initiation of specific spot requests to various collectors for information on reception of VOA broadcasts in the Soviet Bloc (ARI 15-51) and for interrogation of escapees on VOA broadcasts and their effectiveness and Communist reaction thereto (ARI 15-110). A particularly effective means of increasing the flow of such information from Army collectors has been through briefing of intelligence personnel in the field by G2 representatives. Despite the foregoing efforts, however, G2 recognizes that it cannot satisfy more than a portion of the requirements placed on it by CG/PsyWar and USIA on a continuing basis. Coordination among producers and collectors needs to be further developed, particularly at Washington level.

6. With regard to your question (4), G2 has not recently levied any specific requests on the State Department for finished intelligence on any of the items listed. G2 does, however, make extensive use of finished intelligence produced by OIR for the intelligence community. Particular use is made of political, sociological and psychological intelligence in the NIS, in the Soviet Affairs monthly and in the publications of the Psychological Intelligence and Research Staff. These publications are supplemented by working-level contacts whereby OIR readily provides spot assistance of considerable value. In view of OIR's lack of capability to accept major specific projects from individual agencies, while meeting its overall obligations, G2 has sought instead to arrange a coordinated effort, as in the case of the Resistance Intelligence Committee. The entire raw intelligence output of OIR (and CIA) is available to Army PsyWar through the G2 Reading Panel.

/s/

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